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Abstract
In this paper it is shown that given a sufficient number of (noisy) random binary linear equations,
the Learning from Parity with Noise (LPN) problem can be solved in essentially cube root time in
the number of unknowns. The techniques used to recover the solution are known from fast correlation
attacks on stream ciphers. As in fast correlation attacks, the performance of the algorithm depends on
the number of equations given. It is shown that if this number exceeds a certain bound, and the bias of
the noisy equations is polynomial in number of unknowns n, the running time of the algorithm is reduced
to 2
n
3
+o(n) compared to the brute force checking of all 2n possible solutions. The mentioned bound is
explicitly given and it is further shown that when this bound is exceeded, the complexity of the approach
can even be further reduced.
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1 Introduction
In many cryptanalyses, especially in fast correlation attacks on stream ciphers, some information on the
secret key is leaked in form of a set of linear binary equations which are satisfied with probability bigger
than one half. For each of these equations, let q = 12 + ǫ be the probability that the secret key is in the
solution set. We call ǫ the bias. It is clear that if ǫ = 12 , every equation essentially halfes the number of
possible solutions, as long as it is independent from the previous ones. In particular if the system of equation
has full rank, the key can be recovered in polynomial time by simple Gaussian Elimination. An interesting
problem lies in how to recover the key if ǫ < 12 . The LPN problem (e.g. [6],[7]) captures the essence of this
task. Let
• x ∈ Fn2 be a n-dimensional binary vector, also referred to as the key in the sequel.
• E ∼ Ber(p) be a random variable with Pr(E = 1) = p = 12 − ǫ and Pr(E = 0) = q =
1
2 + ǫ, ǫ ∈
[
0, 12
]
.
• Øǫ be an oracle that uniformly at random chooses g ∈ F
n
2 and outputs pairs (〈g, x〉 + e, g) where e is
drawn according to E and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the usual inner product. The g’s can be seen as binary linear
equations and computing the scalar product with x corresponds to evaluating them at x.
The n-dimensional LPNǫ problem can be stated as follows: Given Øǫ and ǫ, recover x. A lower bound on the
number N of oracle calls necessary in order to be able to identify the correct x with non-negligible probability
can be given. This bound corresponds to the number of samples N necessary in order to make a good guess
whether a random variable X is distributed according to Be(p) or X ∼ Be
(
1
2
)
, where Be denotes the usual
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bernoulli distribution. It is common knowledge that this number satisfies N = O
(
1
ǫ2
)
, as can easily be seen
by Hoeffding’s inequality [2]. As a consequence x can be recovered in time O(2n log 1ǫ2 ) making N = O
(
1
ǫ2
)
oracle calls. This is achieved by evaluating all equations at 2n points, using the techniques of fast Walsh
transform [3]. While the LPN problem is proven to be NP-hard [1], in the case where N ≫ 1ǫ2 faster
approaches than brute-force checking of all potential keys are possible. Especially the techniques known
from fast correlation attacks (see e.g. [3], [4], [8]) are well applicable. The core of most techniques lies
in finding linear combinations of the given equations such that a hypothesis on a subset of keybits can be
tested. The application of these techniques to the LPN problem has been studied already in e.g. [2, 5, 7].
While the attack we consider is not different to e.g. the one in [5], the approach to the problem is another.
From past work, e.g. [2, 3, 5, 4, 7], it is not immediately clear how the complexity behaves depending on
the number N of random linear equations and the bias ǫ. The influence of N and ǫ becomes explicit in our
considerations. We will show that if ǫ = 1poly(n) , then the LPN problem can be solved in time 2
n
3 +o(n) given
N = 2
n
log n+o(n) equations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a short overview on the fast correlation attack techniques
is given. In Section 3 it is shown how the complexity to recover the secret key depends on the number N of
oracle calls and the main result is stated at the end of the section. Section 3.1 contains the case where the
number N of given equations exceeds the bound sufficient for a cube root attack. In Section 4 an illustrating
example is given. Throughout the paper, log will denote the logarithm to base 2.
2 Linear Combination and Hypothesis Testing
Most fast correlation attacks rely on the principles of linear combination and hypothesis testing. The goal of
linear combination lies in constructing binary linear equations that depend only on a subset of the keybits.
These equations can then be used to test a hypothesis on this subset of keybits. Let g′i = (〈gi, x〉+ ei, gi) ∈
F
n+1
2 be a sample output by the oracle Øǫ. Note that if we add w random samples g
′
i1
, . . . , g′iw from Øǫ, i.e.
if we consider g˜ =
(∑
j〈gij , x〉+
∑
j eij ,
∑
j gij
)
=
(
〈
∑
j gij , x〉+
∑
j eij ,
∑
j gij
)
this looks like a sample
output from Øǫ˜, with ǫ˜ = 2
w−1ǫw. This can be seen by the well known Piling-up lemma (e.g. [10]). By
appropriately choosing w-tuples of samples from Øǫ, we can get equations from Øǫ˜ which depend only on a
subset of keybits.
Lemma 1. Let w ∈ N be even and N ≫ w be the number of samples given from Øǫ. Then all w-ary linear
combinations of these equations which are all zero in the last b bits can be found in time and space
O
(
max
{
N
w
2 ,
Nw
2b
})
. (1)
Proof. The number of all w2 -ary linear combinations of the given equations equals(
N
w/2
)
= Θ
(
N
w
2
)
, (2)
for fixed w. Compute these linear combinations and store the resulting equations in blocks according to the
last b bits, i.e. inside a block the new equations coincide on the last b bits. In each of the 2b blocks there
are an expected number of (
N
w/2
)
2b
equations. Inside each block, take all 2-ary combinations which every time gives an expected number of(( N
w/2
)
2b
)2
equations of the desired form. As there are 2b blocks, we get an expected number
2b
((
N
w/2
)
2b
)2
= Θ
(
Nw/2
2b
)
, (3)
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equations of the desired form. The complexity of the whole is the sum of the complexities for getting all the
w
2 -ary linear combinations (2) and and all the 2-ary combinations (3) inside the 2
b blocks.
Clearly the N
w
2b equations found as in Lemma 1 depend on the first n− b keybits only. A hypothesis on
these bits can be tested if
Nw
2b
≥
1
ǫ′2
=
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
, (4)
as discussed in Section 1. Note that we implicitly assume that the new equations are pairwise independent,
what seems to be a admissible assumption [8]. In order to find the correct n−b keybits, all possible hypotheses
on these bits are checked. This can be done by techniques of the fast Walsh transform [3].
Lemma 2. Evaluating 1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
binary linear equations in n− b variables can be done in time
2n−b log
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
. (5)
In the next section we derive the optimal choice of the parameters w and b, and we will see how the
resulting complexity behaves depending on N .
3 Cube-root algorithm
Suppose we are given N ≥ 1ǫ2 samples from Øǫ. In Section 2 we have seen that
• if for w, b ∈ N it holds that w is even and
Nw
2b
≥
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
, (6)
then we can recover the first n− b keybits in time
O
(
max
{
N
w
2 ,
Nw
2b
, 2n−b log
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
})
. (7)
In this section we will show how to find optimal parameters b and w such that the expression in (7) is
minimal under the condition that the inequality (6) is satisfied. Clearly (6) is equivalent to
w (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ) ≥ b+ 2,
by taking the logarithm on both sides. We will now show that in order to reach minimal complexity in (7)
this inequality must be satisfied with equality. Note that the right hand side of the inequality is increasing
with b and as N ≥ 1ǫ2 , the left hand side is increasing with w. Suppose that for a given choice of b and w
the inequality is strict. Then either b can be increased or w can be decreased resulting in a decrease of the
overall complexity (7), while the inequality still holds. So we can require equality
w (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)− 2 = b. (8)
Using this in equation (7), we get the following overall complexity
O
(
max
{
N
w
2 ,
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
, 2n
1
Nw
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
log
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
})
.
In order to ease discussion we adjust the condition on N . From now on we will assume that
N ≥
4
(2ǫ)4
.
As a direct consequence
N
w
2 ≥
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
,
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and the overall complexity equals
O

max

N
w
2︸︷︷︸
α(w)
, 2n
1
Nw
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
log
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w︸ ︷︷ ︸
β(w)



 .
One readily verifies that α(w) is growing with w and β(w) is decreasing with w. Hence the whole term reaches
its minimum at the intersection of the two functions, i.e. if α(w) = β(w). In order to get an (approximate)
solution for the equation α(w) = β(w), we ignore the logarithmic term in β(w) and obtain:
w =
n+ 2
3/2 logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ
. (9)
Using (8), for b we obtain:
b = w (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)− 2 = n−
(n+ 2) logN
3 logN + 4 + 4 log ǫ
= n−
w
2
logN. (10)
We will now examine how this choice of the parameters affects the complexity of the linear combination and
hypothesis testing approach. For simplicity in the further analysis let us define
Tǫ(N) :=
logN
3 logN + 4 + 4 log ǫ
. (11)
So we can write
w =
2(n+ 2)
logN
Tǫ(N), (12)
and
b = w (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)− 2 = n− (n+ 2)Tǫ(N). (13)
Lemma 3. Notation as in the considerations before. Making N ≥ 4(2ǫ)4 oracle calls and writing r :=
w − 2
⌊
w+1
2
⌋
and T := Tǫ(N), the n-dimensional LPNǫ problem can be solved in time and space
O
(
2(n+2)T+|r| logN+log((n+2)T+logN)
)
. (14)
Proof. Let w be as in (9). Define
w′ := 2
⌊
w + 1
2
⌋
and b′ := ⌊w′ (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)− 2⌋ . (15)
This definition ensures that w′ and b′ are integers and w′ = w + r is even with r ∈ [−1, 1]. Further
Nw
′
2b′
≥
Nw
2b
=
1
22(w−1)ǫ2w
,
so we have enough equations to check a hypothesis on the n − b′ nonzero bits. The complexity for finding
the w′-ary linear equations equals
N
w′
2 = N
w
2 +
r
2 = 2(n+2)T+
r
2 logN .
Let us now examine the complexity for evaluating these equations at 2n−b
′
points. We have
b′ = ⌊w′ (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)− 2⌋
= ⌊(w + r) (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)− 2⌋
= ⌊w (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)− 2 + r (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)⌋
≥ w (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)− 2 + r (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)− 1/2
(13)
= n− (n+ 2)T + r (logN + 2 + 2 log ǫ)− 1/2.
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Hence
2n−b
′
log
Nw
′
2b′
≤ 2(n+2)T−r(logN+2+2 log ǫ)+1/2 logN
w′
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤(n+2)T+ 12 logN
.
Adding these two upper bounds, we obtain the overall complexity
2n−b
′
log
Nw
′
2b′
+N
w′
2 ≤ 2(n+2)T
(
2−r(logN+2+2 log ǫ)+
1
2+log((n+2)T+
r
2 logN) + 2
r
2 logN
)
(16)
= O
(
2(n+2)T+r logN+log((n+2)T+
1
2 logN)
)
(17)
Corollary 1. Using the notation from the previous lemma. Making N ≥ 4(2ǫ)4 oracle calls the n-dimensional
LPNǫ problem can be solved in time and space
O
(
2(n+2)T+logN+log((n+2)T+logN)
)
.
Proof. Immediately as |r| =
∣∣w − 2 ⌊w+12 ⌋∣∣ ≤ 1.
It is not hard to see that if logN is large, Tǫ(N) will converge to
1
3 . Clearly
Tǫ(N) =
logN
3 logN + 4 + 4 log ǫ
=
1
3
(
1−
4 + 4 log ǫ
3 logN + 4 + 4 log ǫ
)
.
Recall that log ǫ < −1 and since N > 4(2ǫ)4 we have that logN > −2− 4 log ǫ. Consequently
Tǫ(N) <
1
3
(
1 +
4 + 4 log ǫ
2 + 8 log ǫ
)
<
1
3
(
1 +
1
2
)
=
1
2
.
In the case where N is significantly bigger, particularly if
N ≥
4
(2ǫ)4
2
n
log n > 2
n
log n−
4
3−
4
3 log ǫ,
one readily verifies that
Tǫ(N) ≤
1
3
(
1−
4
3
(1 + log ǫ) logn
n
)
. (18)
We can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4. If ǫ = 1poly(n) we can solve the n-dimensional LPNǫ in time and space
2
n
3 +o(n),
making N ≥ 2
n
log n 4
(2ǫ)4 oracle calls.
Proof. First notice that with ǫ = 1poly(n) , we have that log
1
ǫ = o(n). We will use only a subset of N
′ =
2
n
log n 4
(2ǫ)4 of the given equations. Write T
′ := Tǫ(N
′). Then
(n+ 2)T ′ =
n+ 2
3
(
1−
4 logn(log ǫ+ 1)
3n
)
=
1
3
n+
2
3
−
4(n+ 2)
n
(log ǫ+ 1) logn︸ ︷︷ ︸
=o(n)
.
Further
logN ′ =
n
logn
+ log
4
(2ǫ)4
= o(n).
So from Lemma 3 and as also log ((n+ 2)T ′ + logN ′) = o(n), we get that we can find the solution in time
O
(
2(n+2)T
′+logN ′+log((n+2)T ′+logN ′)
)
= 2
n
3 +o(n).
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We have seen that we do not need more than N = 2
n
log n+o(n) equations to solve the LPN problem in
essentially cube-root time. As seen in the proof of Lemma 4, given N ≫ 2
n
log n the approach makes use
of N ′ = 2
n
log n 4
(2ǫ)4 of the given equations. The resulting overhead can be exploited to further reduce the
complexity. The principle used in the case where N ≫ 2
n
log n is called decimation [5]. Given
N = 2l2
n
log n
4
(2ǫ)4
equations, the problem is basically reduced to solving the LPN problem in dimension n− l.
3.1 Decimation
We have seen that if N = 2
n
log n 4
(2ǫ)4 the complexity of the LPN problem is 2
n
3 +o(n). If we are given
N ≫ 2
n
log n 4
(2ǫ)4 equations, simple decimation allows to reduce the security parameter n of the problem.
Suppose we are given
N = 2
n
log n+l
4
(2ǫ)4
,
equations with l < n−2. We want to consider only the equations that do not depent on (e.g. the first) l′ ∈ N
bits of the key x. We have an expected number N2−l
′
of such equations. In order to be able to recover the
remaining n− l′ keybits, the following equality must hold
N2−l
′
= 2
n
log n+l−l
′ 4
(2ǫ)4
≥ 2
n−l′
log(n−l′)
4
(2ǫ)4
.
Equivalently,
n
logn
+ l − l′ ≥
n− l′
log(n− l′)
.
Setting l′ = ⌊l⌋ ≤ n− 3, this inequality is satisfied and we can reduce the problem parameter n to n− l.
Lemma 5. If ǫ = 1poly(n) we can solve the LPNǫ in time and space
2
n−l
3 +o(n).
making N ≥ 2
n
log n+l 4
(2ǫ)4 oracle calls.
4 Example
We have seen that the LPN problem can be solved in essentially cube-root time and space. Consider the
classical setting of a fast correlation attack [9]. Suppose we have a stream cipher with keylength n = 128
whose output bits correspond to linear combinations of the keybits transmitted over the binary symmetric
channel with crossover probability 12 − ǫ =
1
2 −
1
8 = 0.375. For a given number N ≥ 2
10 (note that
log 4(2ǫ)4 = 10) of equations, we have seen how to in principle optimally choose w and b (see (9) and (10)).
However these values are not necessarily in N and w is not necessarily even. So w is rounded to the nearest
even number w′ and b′ is chosen accordingly (see (15) in the proof of Lemma 3). This gives an additional
summand < |r| logN in the exponent of the complexity (compare (14)). Table 4 shows how this rounding
problem influences the complexity. Decimation is not considered in this example.
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logN w b w′ b′ |r| logN logCLC logCHT
10 11.82 68.91 12 70 1.8 60 63.64
20 5 78 6 94 20 60 38.70
30 3.17 80.44 4 102 24.8 60 30.17
40 2.32 81.57 2 70 12.8 40 61.32
47 1.95 82.06 2 84 2.1 47 47.32
50 1.83 82.22 2 90 8.5 50 41.32
Table 1: Complexity of Linear Combination CLC and Hypothesis testing CHT depending on the number of
equations.
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